Metropolitan Club, DC, All the Presidents’ Wars event

USC DC, All the Presidents’ Wars, book event

USC DC, All the Presidents’ Wars, book event

The Inheritance: A conversation with author Janet Reitman and Peter Bergen, New America, ONLINE

EVENT

October 15, 2026

The Inheritance

A conversation with Janet Reitman and Peter Bergen
VIRTUAL
12PM – 1PM EDT

Meridian Summit, US Chamber of Commerce, DC

Now in its 15th year, the Summit is Washington’s definitive forum at the intersection of diplomacy, business, and geopolitics.
WHEN: OCTOBER 16, 2026 at 8:00 AM

WHERE: U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

8:00 AM — Welcome Breakfast

8:25 AM — Executive Briefings

9:00 AM — Welcome Remarks

9:10 AM — America’s Influence at 250

9:35 AM — Commercial Diplomacy and the Future of Global Influence

10:00 AM — Meridian Corporate Leadership Award Presentation

10:10 AM — Networking Break

10:20 AM — Executive Briefings

10:55 AM — Investing in American Influence

11:10 AM — The Technology Frontier

11:35 AM — Fireside with Ambassador Mike Waltz2026 Summit Speakers

Combiz Abdolrahimi
Vice President and Global Head of Government Affairs and Public Policy, ServiceNow

Read Bio
Kylie Atwood
Kylie Atwood
National Security Correspondent, CNN

Read Bio

Congressman Ami Bera, M.D.
U.S. Representative (CA-06)

Read bio

Peter Bergen
Vice President for Global Studies & Fellows, New America

Read bio
Vinay Chawla
Vinay Chawla
Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Read Bio

T.H. Harry Coker, Jr.
Secretary, Maryland Department of Commerce

Read bio

T.H. David Bohigian
CEO, Meridian International Center

Read Bio
Ashley E. Davis
Ashley E. Davis
Partner, S-3 Group

Read bio

Congresswoman April McClain Delaney
U.S. Representative (MD-06)

Read bio

Daniel Desrochers
International Trade Reporter, POLITICO

Read bio

Theresa (Terri) Fariello
Executive Vice President, Government Affairs & Global Public Policy, United Airlines

Read Bio
Theresa Hitchens
Theresa Hitchens
Senior Space Reporter, Breaking Defense

Read bio

Alek Jovovic
Deputy Director, Center for the Industrial Base

Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Read bio

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Keith Kellogg
Former Assistant to the President and Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine

Advisory Board Chair, BGR Group

Read Bio

Mahnaz Khan
Vice President of Policy for Critical Supply Chains, Silverado Policy Accelerator

Read bio

Deborah Lehr
Chair of the Board of Trustees, Meridian International Center

Read Bio

Kim Majerus
Vice President, US Public Sector Education, State & Local Government, Amazon Web Services (AWS)

Read bio

Lance D. Mangum
Vice President, Government Affairs, FedEx Corp.

Read bio

Conor McQuaid
Chairman & CEO, Pernod Ricard North America

Read Bio
Steve Morrissey
Steve Morrissey
Vice President, International Regulatory and Policy, United Airlines

Read Bio

Dr. Elizabeth Newbury
Senior Director, Center for Technology, Innovation and Space, Meridian International Center

Read bio

Ross Perot, Jr.
Chairman of The Perot Companies; Chairman of Hillwood; Chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors

Read Bio

Dr. Alina Polyakova
President & CEO, Center for European Policy Analysis

Read bio

Joe Quinn
Executive Director, Center for Strategic Industrial Materials, SAFE (Securing America’s Future Energy)

Read bio
Goli Sheikholeslami
Goli Sheikholeslami
CEO, POLITICO

Read bio

Rick R. Suárez
Senior Vice President, US President and Head of US  BioPharmaceuticals Business Unit, AstraZeneca

Read Bio

Natalie Buda Smith
Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer, Library of Congress

Read bio

H.E. Birgitta Tazelaar
Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of America

Read bio

Brianne Todd
Professor of the Practice, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Read bio

Ambassador Mike Waltz
U.S. Representative to the United Nations

Read Bio
Joshua Walker
Joshua Walker
Senior Vice President, Chief International Affairs Officer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Read Bio

Dr. Brian Weeden
Director of Civil and Commercial Policy for the Center for Space Policy and Strategy, Aerospace Corporation

Click Here

Kellee Wicker
Vice President of the Center for Technology, Innovation, and Space, Meridian International Center

Read bio

“Terrorists and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A History of Hype and the Possibility of a Dystopian Future,” West Point’s Sentinel

Terrorists and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A History of Hype and the Possibility of a Dystopian Future
SEPTEMBER 2026, VOLUME 19, ISSUE 9

Authors:
PETER BERGEN

Categories:
COUNTERTERRORISMWEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
SHARE VIA:

PDF
Abstract: After 9/11, the Bush administration was preoccupied by the possibility of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), so much so that the United States went to war in Iraq. In fact, in the post-9/11 era, terrorists only experimented with crude WMD of low lethality. However, now that we are in the age of AI and synthetic biology, terrorists—who are often well educated—will likely be able to create pathogens in a manner that was not available to militants of an earlier era. This feels like a dystopian reality rather than politicized hype, because it is AI industry leaders, not politicians, who are sounding the alarm about the issue.

The United States went to war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in March 2003 based on the false assertions of dodgy defectors and the faulty assumptions of U.S. policymakers that the Iraqi dictator had weapons of mass destruction that he might give to his allies in al-Qa`ida. None of this was true, but the subsequent invasion of Iraq and Iraqi civil war claimed the lives of some 200,000 Iraqi civilians1 and those of 4,418 American service members,2 and in the process greatly damaged global perceptions of American power and undermined faith in the U.S. government at home.

This article will not rehash any of this well-documented history but instead will attempt to explain why senior Bush administration officials became preoccupied with the idea of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) following the 9/11 attacks. The article will then examine the history of how terrorists experimented with WMD, producing only relatively crude weapons in the two decades that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq despite much of the hyperbole surrounding the issue. It will then try to answer two pressing questions: Do advances in the fields of genetic editing and artificial intelligence change the game, so that what was once a fanciful notion—that terrorists might kill very large numbers of people with WMD—could become a bleak future reality? Does the history of hype about terrorists deploying WMD hold lessons that might be applicable today?

The 9/11 attacks came as a complete surprise to senior Bush administration officials, even though they had received a stream of highly classified warnings from the CIA during the spring and summer of 2001 that al-Qa`ida was planning a large-scale attack, including possibly in the United States.3 At the time, key Bush officials were so preoccupied by the purported threats posed by states such as Iraq that they discounted the notion that a non-state actor such as al-Qa`ida was a real threat. Underlining their preoccupation with state sponsors of terrorism, immediately after 9/11 senior Bush officials such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pushed for attacks against countries such as Iraq, which had concealed its active weapons of mass destruction WMD program during the 1980s.4

After 9/11, the thinking of President Bush and his war cabinet was greatly influenced by the anthrax attacks in the United States that took just place just weeks after al-Qa`ida had attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. During October 2001, letters containing anthrax were sent to American journalists and members of Congress, killing five people and shaping President Bush’s understanding of the post-9/11 threat landscape, as they seemed to show that terrorists were now deploying WMD in the United States. The letters themselves contained the phrases “Death to America,” “Death to Israel,” and “Allah is great.”5 In fact, the FBI would eventually determine that Bruce E. Ivins, a biological weapons researcher working for the U.S. government who had access to highly secure biolabs, was solely responsible for the attacks.6

At the Bush White House, worries about terrorist access to WMD intensified when the CIA discovered that before 9/11, Usama bin Ladin had met in Afghanistan with Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist who had been fired from his country’s nuclear program in 1999 because of his militant jihadi views. Bin Ladin had claimed to Mahmood that he possessed fissile materials suitable for a nuclear weapon, while Mahmood had shown bin Ladin a sketch about how to build a nuclear bomb.7 Sketching a nuclear bomb design is a very long way from actually building one, and bin Ladin’s boast about fissile materials was almost certainly false; instead, al-Qa`ida had very likely purchased quantities of radioactive waste. Still, Mahmood’s meeting with bin Ladin indicated that al-Qa`ida’s leaders were interested in learning about the most lethal forms of WMD and had connections to scientists who appeared to share their worldview.

After 9/11, al-Qa`ida’s leaders stepped up their public rhetoric about their purported access to WMD. On November 8, 2001, bin Ladin told Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, “I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may reply with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.” This statement was followed in May 2003 by a fatwa from a militant Saudi cleric, Nasir bin Hamd al-Fahd, that gave religious sanction to those who wanted to use WMD on large numbers of American civilians.8

Vice President Dick Cheney became so concerned about the possibility of some kind of chemical or biological weapons terrorist attack that after 9/11, he kept a full biohazard suit on hand when he traveled.9 Yet, if Bush administration officials had had more familiarity with the history of non-state actors using WMD, perhaps they would have been more skeptical that al-Qa`ida could pull off a large-scale attack with weapons of mass destruction.

The case of Aum Shinrikyo is instructive. A Japanese cult with tens of thousands of followers who subscribed to obscure, apocalyptic beliefs, Aum actively recruited from among the best and brightest in Japan and had access to hundreds of millions of dollars donated by its followers.10 Despite recruiting scientists and possessing large-scale resources, when they manufactured sarin gas, a highly toxic nerve agent, they were able to kill only the relatively small number of 13 people in the crowded, enclosed environment of the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995.

The Aum attack underlined that even terrorists with real scientific knowledge and considerable financial resources did not successfully build true weapons of mass destruction, although they could deploy weapons of mass disruption that could sow panic with relatively small-bore chemical or biological weapons attacks.

In one of the grimmer ironies of the war on terror, the Iraq War helped to create an alliance between some of Saddam’s Ba’athist officials and members of al-Qa`ida, which resulted in the creation of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) that deployed crude WMD weapons. In other words, the Iraq War produced the al-Qa`ida–Ba’athist–WMD nexus it was supposed to prevent.

From late 2006 through mid-2007, AQI detonated a series of crude chemical bombs in Iraq that were designed to spread what they hoped would be lethal quantities of chlorine, widely available in the Middle East for treating water. The U.S. military killed or captured many of the insurgents who were deploying these bombs. Charles Faddis, who headed the CIA’s operations against AQI’s chlorine bomb network, explained, “There was a lot of effort to secure the chlorine, to get a hold of the tanks, to track these guys down (who were responsible for building the chlorine bombs) to kill them or capture them. Meanwhile the attacks are not being particularly successful. The people are dying in the blast, but fortunately nobody is dying from chlorine.”11

Over time, AQI would morph into the Islamic State, which in 2014 seized much of Syria and Iraq. The Islamic State also experimented with WMD weapons, but again these were relatively crude chlorine-based devices. The group used these bombs dozens of times against the Iraqi military and Syrian Kurdish forces.12

The Islamic State mounted a more ambitious chemical weapons effort between 2015 and 2017, producing mustard gas and adding the agent to bombs and rockets. Yet, they only produced mustard gas at relatively low concentrations, unlike the mustard gas that was used by the armies that fought during World War I.13

Overall, the Islamic State’s chemical weapons efforts were not much more sophisticated than AQI’s, although the Islamic State, a terrorist army of some 30,000 fighters, at one point controlled a population greater than that of New York City that it was able to tax and extort from at will.14 At its height, the group’s claims to be the “Islamic State” had some basis in truth, and yet even with its substantial resources and its large-scale recruitment of militants, including 40,000 jihadis from around the Muslim world, the Islamic State still could not create an effective WMD program.

During the post-9/11 period, several would-be terrorists hoped to create effective chemical weapons by manufacturing ricin. Ricin, which can be extracted from widely available castor beans, can kill, but only if it is deployed by those with real chemical weapons expertise, as it does not aerosolize well and must typically be injected directly for lethal effects. The most infamous case of ricin poisoning was that of the Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov, who was stabbed by a ricin-tipped umbrella in London in 1978 as he was waiting for a bus near Waterloo Bridge. Markov subsequently died, a death that was almost certainly the work of the KGB or an allied Eastern Bloc intelligence service.15

But in the hands of terrorists, ricin weapons were almost invariably duds. In 2003, an al-Qa`ida-linked militant based in the United Kingdom, Kamel Bourgass, attempted to produce ricin. So too did a Tunisian man living in Cologne in 2018, who was identified by German authorities as Sief Alla H., an Islamic State supporter.16 In 2025, Indian authorities in Gujarat arrested a doctor linked to Islamic State Khorasan, the group’s affiliate headquartered in Afghanistan, who was carrying castor bean mash suitable for making ricin.17 In none of these cases did the militants deploy a ricin weapon.

All this history suggests that terrorists could not deploy true weapons of mass destruction because the barriers to entry were so high. But will those barriers be lowered now that we are in the age of AI and synthetic biology?

Militant groups often recruit educated young men, a demographic that is likely to understand aspects of these emerging technologies. In 2006, New America researcher Swati Pandey and I examined the educational background of 79 jihadi terrorists responsible for five major anti-Western terrorist attacks—the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, the September 11 attacks, the Bali nightclub bombings in 2002, and the London bombings on July 7, 2005. All those who had masterminded the attacks had university degrees. More than half the terrorists involved in them had attended university. Of those who attended a university, more than half had scientific or technical degrees, with engineering being the most popular subject studied.18

A dozen years after our study was published, sociologist Diego Gambetta and political scientist Steffen Hertog co-authored Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education, which examined the educational background of 33519 terrorists across the ideological spectrum, from jihadis to right-wing extremists to leftist terrorists. Gambetta and Hertog found that engineering was by far the most popular subject studied by the militants who had attended university, underlining that terrorists are often well educated with a scientific bent.20

Which brings us to recent developments in the field of AI: In August 2026, Stanford University scientists announced that they had developed an AI program that had designed and made 16 new viruses. These viruses were not pathogens, but the study showed that entirely de novo viruses could now be made by AI. While there are plenty of reasons to celebrate that discovery—the viruses made by the Stanford scientists could be used to kill bacteria that cause disease—it also raises significant questions around biosecurity since de novo viruses are now an alternative path to making biological agents.21

Similarly, when it comes to chemical weapons, in 2022 North Carolina-based Collaborations Pharmaceuticals was contracted by the Swiss Federal Institute for Nuclear, Biologic and Chemical Protection to investigate whether AI systems involved in drug discoveries could generate thousands of novel chemical agents. Using the MegaSyn AI model, which was used to generate safe drugs, a scientist rewarded the model for finding toxic chemicals instead of safe drugs. Within hours, the model generated thousands of highly toxic potential new compounds.22 That said, it is important to emphasize the word “potential.” As Audrey Kurth Cronin pointed out in these pages four years ago, “generating a list of chemicals did not mean the results could be synthesized or would prove stable and effective. Pharmaceutical companies use the same method to create drugs; yet out of millions of compounds, they find few viable enough to enter into production.”23

While much of the focus on the promise and perils of AI is on large language models (LLMs) such as Claude and ChatGPT that can provide detailed answers to a wide range of questions, additional AI tools known as biological design tools (BDTs) can be used to design novel organisms far quicker than any laboratory can.24 Some BDTs are open source, such as AlphaFold, while others require expensive hardware such as Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) that can cost tens of thousands of dollars.

Could terrorist groups exploit these tools in coming years? As scholars Daniel Byman and V.S. Subrahmanian noted in July 2026, terrorists “are not technological pioneers in the conventional sense, but they are often capable adopters.”25 A similar skeptical note had been struck two months earlier in these pages by Andrew Glazzard, David McIlhatton, and Paul Martin, who pointed out that terrorists typically favor technologies that are both accessible and reliable.26

Indeed, the history of terrorism is rife with example of terrorists sticking with tried-and-true methods to murder large numbers of civilians, such as mass shootings, because they are relatively easy to do, especially in the United States where semi-automatic weapons are readily accessible. The most lethal terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 was carried out by Omar Mateen, an American citizen inspired by the Islamic State, who killed 49 patrons at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando in 2016 using semi-automatic weapons. Mateen managed to kill around 10 times more people in his attack than Ivins had with his anthrax attacks, even though Ivins was one of the leading biological weapons researchers in the United States, while Mateen had no training from a terrorist group.

Vehicle ramming requires little skill and preparation. We have seen several of those in the United States since 9/11: an Islamic State-inspired terrorist killed eight in Manhattan using his vehicle as a weapon in 2017,27 for instance, the same year a right-wing extremist rammed a protestor in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing her.28 Early on New Year’s Day 2025, an Islamic State supporter killed 14 people with a truck in New Orleans.29

By contrast, the science around creating de novo viruses is presently highly complex and requires special labs. That said, it is worth noting that, like the much of rest of the world, terrorists are increasingly using AI in their work. In a study of the Nigerian Boko Haram militant group published in July 2026, Antonia Juelich of Cambridge University interviewed 27 former members of the group and found that they had used AI to plan attacks and design explosives. Islamic State members had also provided in-person AI training to the Boko Haram militants. None of this involved WMD research or planning, but it demonstrates that terrorists have moved beyond using AI to create propaganda and have now used these tools for operational planning.30

There is an as-yet unsettled debate about the origins of the COVID-19 virus: Was it inadvertently leaked from a biolab in Wuhan, China, or did the virus cross over into humans from a nearby “wet market” selling exotic animals? This article does not take a position on that important debate, but if the Wuhan lab leak theory is in fact correct, it underlines the very real dangers of “gain of function” research that uses genetic editing to tinker with the traits of viruses, experimentation that was going on at the Wuhan biolab in question.31 This points to how such gain of function research could be used for nefarious purposes; the massive global death toll and the calamitous economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic speak for themselves.

Among AI thought leaders, the possibility that AI tools could be used for gain of function research with nefarious intent is now a very real concern. Efforts to preclude that kind of research are built into closed American AI models such as ChatGPT, which are programmed with ethically based considerations that will, at least in theory, not allow the models to perform substantive research on how to manufacture WMDs.32 In July 2025, OpenAI announced that it was introducing a new framework that explicitly guarded against any queries that were aimed at “bioweaponization.”33 The effectiveness of these guardrails is open to debate since there are ways to circumvent them if inquiries are posed in a deceptive manner, known as jailbreaks.

In July 2026, this journal published research from the non-profit Tech Against Terrorism that queried 27 AI models about WMDs and found that 15 came up with information that exceeded what was publicly available, while a third gave “real assistance” to either make or plan a WMD mass casualty attack, a sobering finding.34

So where does that leave us? Senior Bush administration officials, caught completely by surprise by the 9/11 attacks, went into overdrive in the other direction and adopted a sky-is-falling approach to WMD that embroiled the United States in a disastrous war of choice in Iraq. During the quarter century since 9/11, terrorists have created and used chemical weapons, but with a scant record of success in terms of their lethality, despite all the hype around the topic of terrorists armed with WMD.

We now stand on the brink of a new era, and the capabilities of AI and synthetic biology do present terrorist groups or individuals with idiosyncratic motives new tools to potentially create mass mayhem and murder. This feels like a dystopian reality rather than politicized hype, because it is AI industry leaders, not politicians, who are sounding the alarm about the issue. Demis Cambiss, who founded Google’s DeepMind and won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 2024, as well as Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, warned publicly in June 2026 that some AI systems “now outperform PhD-level virologists on questions about highly technical laboratory procedures.”35

Thomas Schelling succinctly observed in his preface to Roberta Wohlstetter’s 1962 book, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision: “There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.”36 The United States discovered that to its cost on 9/11. Policymakers around the world must ensure that the fruits of the dual revolutions in AI and gene editing do not end up in the wrong hands, creating a weapon that might rival, or even eclipse, 9/11 in its impact on the world. CTC

Peter Bergen is a vice president at New America, a professor of practice at Arizona State University, a CNN national security analyst, and the author of All the Presidents’ Wars: Twenty-Five Years of America’s War on Terror (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2026).

© 2026 Peter Bergen

Citations
[1] “Human Cost of Post-9/11 Wars: Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones,” Watson School of International and Public Affairs, Brown University, September 1, 2021.

[2] “U.S. Military Casualties – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (As of August 31, 2026),” Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed September 1, 2026.

[3] “The 9/11 Commission Report,” 2004.

[4] “IRAQ: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 3, 2005.

[5] “A mystery unravelled,” Economist, Agust 7, 2008; Sarah Pruitt, “When Anthrax-Laced Letters Terrorized the Nation,” History.com, October 4, 2018.

[6] “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation,” FBI.Gov, n.d., accessed August 18, 2026.

[7] Peter Bergen, All the Presidents’ Wars: Twenty-Five Years of America’s War on Terror (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2026), pp. 58-59.

[8] Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Globalising Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons,” Survival 55:2 (2013): pp. 147-162.

[9] Mark Mooney, “Cheney Thought He Had Lethal Anthrax Dose,” ABC News, July 14, 2008.

[10] “Aum Shinrikyo: The Japanese Cult behind the Tokyo Sarin Attack,” BBC, July 6, 2018; “Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo,” Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Statement, October 31, 1995.

[11] Author interview, Charles Faddis, January 2010; Peter Bergen, “Al Qaeda’s Track Record with Chemical Weapons,” CNN, May 7, 2013.

[12] Columb Strack, “The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts,” CTC Sentinel 10:9 (2017).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Rukmini Callimachi, “The ISIS Files,” New York Times, April 4, 2018.

[15] Megan Friedman, “Georgi Markov and the Umbrella Gun,” Time, February 17, 2010.

[16] Florian Flade, “The June 2018 Cologne Ricin Plot: A New Threshold in Jihadi Bio Terror,” CTC Sentinel 11:7 (2018).

[17] Animesh Roul, “Ricin Threat and the Jihadist Conspiracy against India,” MP-IDSA Commentary, November 13, 2025.

[18] Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” Washington Quarterly 29:2 (2006): pp. 115-125.

[19] Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 8.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Clive Cookson, “AI Creates First Synthetic Viruses,” Financial Times, August 6, 2026.

[22] Fabio Urbina, Filippa Lentzos, Cédric Invernizzi, and Sean Ekins, “AI in Drug Discovery: A Wake-up Call,” Drug Discovery Today 28:1 (2023).

[23] Audrey Kurth Croin, “Biology’s Tectonic Shifts and Novel Risks,” CTC Sentinel 15:5 (2022).

[24] “Department of Homeland Security Report on Reducing the Risks at the Intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 26, 2024.

[25] Daniel Byman and V. S. Subrahmanian, “Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Terrorism,” Audio Briefs, CSIS, July 10, 2026.

[26] Andrew Glazzard, David McIlhatton, and Paul Martin, “Will Generative AI Fundamentally Change Terrorist Threats?” CTC Sentinel 19:5 (2026).

[27] Benjamin Mueller, William K. Rashbaum, and Al Baker, “Terror Attack Kills 8 and Injures 11 in Manhattan,” New York Times, October 31, 2017.

[28] “Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to 29 Federal Hate Crimes for August 2017 Car Attack at Rally in Charlottesville,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 27, 2019.

[29] “New Orleans Attack: Driver Acted Alone in ISIS-Inspired Rampage That Killed 14, Authorities Say,” NBC News, January 2, 2025.

[30] Dustin Volz and Eric Schmitt, “How Terrorist Groups Are Using A.I. to Gain an Edge in Battle,” New York Times, July 15, 2026.

[31] Jocelyn Kaiser, “NIH Says Grantee Failed to Report Experiment in Wuhan That Created a Bat Virus That Made Mice Sicker,” Science, October 21, 2021.

[32] Kevin Collier and Jasmine Cui, “ChatGPT Safety Systems Can Be Bypassed to Get Weapons Instructions,” NBC News, October 10, 2025.

[33] Adam Hadley, “Feature Commentary: Guardrails Under Test: Terrorist Misuse of AI Models and the Open-Weight ‘Abliteration’ Problem,” CTC Sentinel 19:7 (2026).

[34] “Preparing for future AI capabilities in biology,” OpenAI, June 18, 2025.

[35] “AI Executives Make Rare Collective Warning on Bioweapons Threat,” Semafor, June 4, 2026; “In Support of Mandatory Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening and Recordkeeping,” dj.com, June 2026.

[36] Thomas C. Schelling in Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. vii.

How Non-State Groups Are Reshaping Warfare and Terrorism with Armed Drones

Co-written with David Sterman.

https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/25-Years-After-911-The-Future-Of-The-Global-Jihadi-Movement.pdf

A CNN journalist spent years reporting on al-Qaeda. Now he’s handing over a massive archive. Washington Post

Media
A CNN journalist spent years reporting on al-Qaeda. Now he’s handing over a massive archive.
On the 25th anniversary of 9/11, Peter Bergen donated more than 150,000 pages of documents to Georgetown University.

September 7, 2026
6 min

By Scott Nover
Peter Bergen has a unique collection, not stamps or coins or baseball cards but something altogether more lurid: a comprehensive trove detailing the rise of al-Qaeda.

Bergen, 63, a journalist who has covered national security for CNN since the 1990s, produced the network’s 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden — bin Laden’s first television interview — and has been one of the foremost chroniclers of the U.S. war on terror.

Get a curated selection of 10 of our best stories in your inbox every weekend.
In the process, Bergen has amassed stacks of papers, photographs, recordings and artifacts.

For the 25th anniversary of the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 — planned and executed by al-Qaeda — Bergen is donating his archive to Georgetown University’s library so it can be a resource for scholars, students and the public.

“I believe in history as being useful for people to try to understand,” Bergen said. “Not that history repeats itself, but it does have a rhyme or two.”

Georgetown is getting 150,000 pages of printed and digital files — documentation from a lifetime of scouring the Middle East. And then there are some special items.

Bergen holds a super-rare paper copy of a fatwa issued by Omar Abdel-Rahman (known as the “blind sheikh”), whom he’s called the “spiritual guide” of the September 11 attacks. Abdel-Rahman issued the theological order while incarcerated in the United States and possibly had it relayed by his lawyer, who was later convicted of relaying violent messages he sent from jail. It was then distributed to attendees at what Bergen called “the one and only al-Qaeda press conference” in Afghanistan in 1998.

“Kill them in the sea, on land, and in the air,” it read. Bergen did not attend the press conference, but obtained the card with an Arabic message from an attendee afterward. He said the fatwa gave religious permission to al-Qaeda’s members to kill Americans and set the stage for the 2001 attacks.

The other crown jewel of the collection is a complete run of al-Jihad magazine, a publication that started in 1984 — before al-Qaeda was even formed — and was sold around the world, even in Brooklyn. Eventually it became what Bergen called the “in-flight magazine of al-Qaeda.”

“When I teach about it, I say that it’s like the Vanity Fair of terrorist publications,” said Bruce Hoffman, a leading terrorism scholar and professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. “It was glossy, it was colorful, it had arresting prose, really dramatic photographs.”

Hoffman, who helped connect Bergen with librarians at Georgetown, said the collection is one of a kind. And it’s especially important, he said, for students who are too young to remember September 11. “It makes history come alive, in essence, when you can look at these archival materials and trace this trajectory, this lineage that led to 9/11,” Hoffman said. “You can understand how earth-shattering it was.”

Bergen first traveled to the Middle East in 1983 when he was 20 years old. A student at Oxford University, Bergen and two friends journeyed to Pakistan to film a documentary about Afghan refugees.
Ask The Post AI
Dive deeper

He worked for ABC News before moving to CNN in 1990. After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Bergen went to his bosses at CNN and said he wanted to investigate what was happening in Afghanistan since the bombers trained there.

It was not until 1996 that he even heard the name Osama bin Laden: “He was trying to keep a low profile,” Bergen said. “He was an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 Trade Center attacks, which is code for, ‘we don’t know what this guy did.’ … He was in the ether. He was a name that came up.” That year, a State Department analysis first identified bin Laden as a financier of radical Islamist groups.

By 1997, a CNN team that included Bergen and correspondent Peter Arnett secured an interview with bin Laden. They agreed to be taken from their hotel in Jalalabad blindfolded to an unknown location in Afghanistan in one vehicle, then another, and then another — all under the cover of darkness — to meet bin Laden and interview him. Bergen was never scared, he said, because he was focused on the job and not the potential danger.

The photos, interview notes, and tapes from that day are part of the archive now in Georgetown’s care.

Bergen wears many hats these days: He’s a CNN national security analyst, author of a new book called “All the Presidents’ Wars,” a vice president at the think tank New America, and is a professor at Arizona State University.

Despite his other academic affiliation, he felt that the collection belonged at Georgetown. Not only is it in Washington, a hub for researchers, and has a leading terrorism studies program, but there’s a personal reason, too: His mother was one of the first female students at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service.

Allan Stypeck, the owner of Second Story Books in Washington’s Dupont Circle neighborhood, appraised the collection.

Stypeck, who is an accredited book and manuscript appraiser and whose projects include Henry Kissinger’s estate, said Bergen’s collection is the “most comprehensive” from a counterterrorism journalist that he has seen. Bergen declined to share the appraisal value, but Stypeck said he “stunned” Bergen with the value of certain items in the collection.
Ask The Post AI
Dive deeper

Ryan Stevenson, who worked with Stypeck on the appraisal, said the comprehensiveness of the collection is what makes it so special.

“The real value of the collection is what it means in its totality and what it’s going to mean for a future researcher to be able to not just find one document that they’re looking for, but to see [how] these social networks actually were interacting with each other in real time,” he said. “You have the [individual] gems, but the real gem is the collection.”

“How Trump has failed to learn the lessons of the wars that followed 9/11,” CNN.com

Friday marks the 25th anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since 9/11, US presidents have expanded their power, step by step, to wage war anywhere, anytime, as they please.

With Operation Epic Fury in Iran, President Donald Trump reached a new peak in the war-making powers claimed by the US commander in chief. Trump launched his war of choice on Iran — in his words, “the world’s No. 1 state sponsor of terror” — without any congressional authorization, the support of NATO allies or a UN resolution. There was also scant buy-in from the American public for what was at its outset the least popular war of the modern era, nor was there anything resembling an imminent threat to the United States. Nor had Trump bothered to learn anything from past American wars, and he did not have a real plan for the “day after” hostilities commenced.

The US military has long been adept at breaking things and killing people, but when its tactics were not aligned with a clear strategy, the United States ended up in the quagmire of Vietnam, or the sectarian civil war in Iraq that eventually birthed ISIS, or precipitating a possible global economic recession caused by the Iran war.

Trump’s predecessors also laid the groundwork for the Iran war. The “war on terror” morphed over time in the months after 9/11, beyond the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda that was backed by the UN and NATO allies. It then grew to encompass President George W. Bush’s doctrine of “preventive war” that justified the 2003 invasion of Iraq. That invasion led to a civil war during which an estimated 200,000 Iraqi civilians died.

The war on terror expanded to include President Barack Obama’s prolific use of armed drones in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen that were not at war with the United States; attacks that killed thousands of suspected terrorists and a sizeble number of civilians.

With UN and NATO support, Obama also ordered the campaign to remove the Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi from power in 2011, but Obama didn’t seek approval from Congress. The overthrow of Gadhafi precipitated a civil war in Libya that lasted a decade, and the country continues to be divided, ruled today by two governments. Obama later said that not planning for the “day after” Gadhafi’s fall was his greatest failure as president.

During the “global war on terror,” the United States cycled through a variety of strategies and tactics, some of which backfired spectacularly. Those include Bush’s Iraq invasion and the bipartisan fiasco of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan more than a decade and a half later, an agreement negotiated under Trump and executed under President Joe Biden.

The US pullout from Afghanistan predictably resulted in the Taliban taking over the country. The debacles of the Iraq War and the Afghanistan withdrawal signaled that the US superpower had little idea what it was doing when it came to foreign policy, which undercut its position around the world.

There were some real American operational successes during the war on terror: The CIA became an effective paramilitary agency hunting and killing terrorists; Joint Special Operations Command transformed from a barely used counterterrorism force to an industrial-level killing machine; US Special Forces partnered adeptly with Afghan and Iraqi ground forces; and the National Security Agency skillfully penetrated enemy communications.

All these developments played important roles in eventually decimating the leadership of al Qaeda and ending the geographical “caliphate” of ISIS. As a result, there were no large-scale lethal attacks by foreign terrorist groups in the United States following 9/11, which was a major national security goal of the four post-9/11 presidents.

Last fall, Trump dramatically expanded the ambit of the war on terror when he claimed that he could kill suspected Latin American drug cartel members at will on the grounds that they were “narcoterrorists.” This resulted in dozens of American strikes on boats transporting drugs in the Caribbean, and when US Joint Special Operations Command captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in early 2026, Trump asserted he was a narcoterrorist.

Encouraged by what he termed the “brilliant” operation to remove Maduro from power, Trump soon issued the order for Operation Epic Fury. This echoed the way the relatively quick war to overthrow the Taliban after 9/11 emboldened Bush to launch the war on Iraq a year and half later.

A lesson that the United States never learned after 9/11: Make real plans for the “day after” the war appears to be won, or you will likely lose the peace. The Bush administration didn’t negotiate a peace agreement with the Taliban after the group was utterly defeated in December 2001 when many of its leaders were looking to cut a deal, which could have avoided many years of war. The many failures to plan for what followed the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq were well known, and yet only eight years later the Obama administration also made no plan for what happened after the overthrow of Gadhafi.

P
The confusion about what constituted American strategic success and merely tactical US wins was particularly evident during the Iran war when the many military victories against the theocrats in Tehran did not produce any meaningful change in the regime. As Trump himself admitted during the first days of the conflict: “You go through this, and then in five years you realize you put somebody in who’s no better.”

This grim prediction would come true in only a matter of weeks. The United States’ dismal record of regime changes in the post-9/11 Middle East also did not inspire confidence that America’s regime decapitation project in Iran would have a happy ending. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime has wielded its newfound control of the Strait of Hormuz to inject great turmoil into the gas and oil markets that fuel the global economy.

Twenty-five years after 9/11, the United States, which once prided itself on being the guarantor of global order, is now its chief disruptor.

“We’ve Forgotten the Most Important Lessons of 9/11,” New York Times

On Feb. 26, 1993, eight years before Sept. 11, Islamist terrorists drove a bomb-laden van into the garage of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan, aiming to bring down the twin towers. The terrorists killed six people, but their grand plan fizzled: The towers still stood.

That attack sent me on a three-decade journey into the world of jihadist terrorism to understand who these Islamist militants were and why they were so bent on attacking the United States. My early focus on Al Qaeda meant that I was the first to produce an in-person television interview of Osama bin Laden in 1997. It also meant I was one of the few reporters with a view of the organization as it grew and changed before and after the attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and hit the Pentagon four years later.

Over the past 25 years, the causes and consequences of the Sept. 11 attacks have faded from memory. And as time has passed, new facts have come to light, some of them uncomfortable for what they reveal about our enemies, our allies and ourselves. Many of the vulnerabilities that Al Qaeda and its founder, Bin Laden, revealed are still with us, and the mistakes we made in responding have proved just as costly.

As the 25th anniversary of the attacks approaches, it is important to set the record straight so that we can avoid self-inflicted mistakes and renew our efforts to prevent a similar attack from happening again.

In March 1997, Al Qaeda was taking no chances with my CNN team. Picking us up at a zero-star hotel in eastern Afghanistan, heavily armed men bundled us into a van and gave us crude blindfolds. We drove through the night to a mud hut high in the freezing mountains, where Bin Laden suddenly appeared out of the darkness.

Sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter Get expert analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.
Little was then publicly known about the small, secretive group that Bin Laden founded in the late 1980s. On camera, he railed against American foreign policy in the Middle East and declared a war against the United States. He made no mention of hating American freedoms, which President George W. Bush would later claim was Al Qaeda’s motivation for this war. And in fact, Bin Laden’s political motivations turned out to be only part of the story, as one uncomfortable fact would soon make clear.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, Bin Laden explained, in a statement broadcast by Al Jazeera, that his war was, in his mind anyway, “fundamentally religious.” The key religious authorization for Al Qaeda to attack American civilian targets came from a fatwa by the Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, a fanatic who was imprisoned in North Carolina during the 1990s. Bin Laden had no formal religious training and believed he needed the fatwa of a prominent cleric to justify his holy war, which most Islamic scholars would not have authorized. Bin Laden’s war was in that sense religious, albeit reliant on a far-from-mainstream interpretation of Islam.

That interpretation is related in turn to a second uncomfortable fact. Fifteen of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers were Saudis, and that was not an accident. Bush officials said comparatively little about Saudi Arabia’s role in promoting its hard-line Wahhabi ideology at home and globally, and the influence that had on Bin Laden. Since 2024, however, a lawsuit filed by the families of some Sept. 11 victims has uncovered disturbing evidence that a Saudi national living in the United States may have had some foreknowledge of the attacks, and that he played a role in supporting two of the hijackers who flew a passenger jet into the Pentagon. The evidence suggests that Al Qaeda enjoyed some level of support in Saudi official circles.

The next uncomfortable fact is that we Americans created the post-9/11 quagmire in the Middle East, not Bin Laden. Some commentators have claimed that the Sept. 11 attacks were a diabolically clever ploy to drag the United States into unwinnable wars in the Muslim world. But in the lead-up to the attacks, Bin Laden truly believed that America was a paper tiger and probably expected, in retaliation, only limited cruise missile strikes or bombing raids against his camps in Afghanistan. His intention was to drive the United States from the region. He could not foresee that a year and a half after Sept. 11, Mr. Bush would start his disastrous war of choice in Iraq.

Bin Laden nonetheless showed the danger that one capable person, with even a relatively small support network, can cause. Even while on the run after Sept. 11, Bin Laden remained a hands-on manager of Al Qaeda, not an isolated figurehead, as the C.I.A. and some scholars assessed. We know this from the documents found in Bin Laden’s hideaway in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where he lived the final five years of his life. Those documents contained another unexpected discovery: Two of Bin Laden’s wives, both with Ph.D.s, played a significant, previously unknown role in shaping his strategic thinking and public statements.

Lastly, while the memory of Sept. 11 has faded, its political effects stay with us, often to our detriment. On his way to the White House in 2016, Donald Trump preyed on voters’ fears about terrorism, which remained the top issue for voters after the economy. His infamous “Muslim ban” was an exploitative response to terrorist threats posed by ISIS, the Islamist extremist group that grew out of America’s post-9/11 war in Iraq.

That fact, as much as any, shows the importance of understanding Sept. 11, 25 years later.

Fanaticism, religious or otherwise, can drive dangerous, nihilistic attacks by those who don’t care what happens to them or their followers. That is particularly worrisome in an age when artificial intelligence could be used to develop and deploy bioweapons against which we have only weak defenses.

Second, just as Bin Laden was able to evade and attack the United States, even after declaring war against it, rogue actors can still threaten today. In an era of near-total surveillance, a Saudi military officer connected to Al Qaeda killed three American sailors in Pensacola, Fla., in 2019. And the weapons available to fanatics are proliferating. As militant groups around the world are deploying armed drones, it is only a matter of time before those weapons are unleashed against targets in the United States.

Finally, in responding to threats, we are potentially our own worst enemy. This story is well enough known, but worth repeating. We didn’t need to go to war in Iraq. Unscrupulous politicians can exploit our lesser instincts for their own ends, often to our detriment.

We can all hope that America and the world won’t face again the kind of surprise attack that Bin Laden launched against the United States on Sept. 11. But at a moment of extraordinary disruption and uncertainty, it’s more important than ever to see clearly the facts about Al Qaeda, Sept. 11 and its aftermath, in case we do.

Peter Bergen is the author of six books about terrorism, and of the just-published “All the Presidents’ Wars: Twenty-Five Years of America’s War on Terror.”

NY Historical, All the Presidents’ Wars: 25 Years of America’s War on Terror Featuring: Peter Bergen, David M. Rubenstein (moderator), NYC

All the Presidents’ Wars: 25 Years of America’s War on Terror
Featuring: Peter Bergen, David M. Rubenstein (moderator)
The Ravenel Curry III Lecture in Foreign Policy
Tuesday, January 12, 6:30 – 7:30 pm
$35 (Members $25)
In-Person Ticket
Livestream

Event Details:
In the 25 years since 9/11, the War on Terror has waged on, costing trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and, for many, a faltering perception of American hegemony. Four presidents have adapted the strategy of their administrations and ideas of their times to make critical decisions that have shaped the role America plays on the world stage. CNN’s national security analyst Peter Bergen joins David M. Rubenstein to discuss how the Bush, Obama, Biden, and Trump strategies have differed, how counterterrorism efforts have developed, and the disasters that might have been avoided in the Middle East had different decisions been made.
Peter Bergen is vice president of New America, CNN’s national security analyst, and the author of several books, including All the Presidents’ Wars: Twenty-Five Years of America’s War on Terror.
David M. Rubenstein (moderator), co-founder and co-chairman of the Carlyle Group, is the host of History with David Rubenstein on PBS and the author of the upcoming Inside the Owner’s Box: Conversations on Power and Leadership in Sports, among other books.
Location:
The Robert H. Smith Auditorium at The New York Historical, 170 Central Park West, New York, NY 10024
Livestreaming:
Unable to attend in person? Join us via livestream!
We will contact all registered attendees with instructions for viewing the livestream the day before and the day of the program. If you do not receive a message, please check your spam folder. Livestream tickets will be available until 5 pm the day of the program. If you need further assistance, please email public.programs@nyhistory.org.

In person: Purchase tickets on site at the admissions desk during Museum hours.
Chair’s Council: Chair’s Council members may request complimentary tickets. To learn more, email chairscouncil@nyhistory.org.
Members: Sign in with your Member login on the next page to receive your discount. If you need a login or have any questions, contact the call center at (212) 485-9268 or call.center@nyhistory.org.
Advance registration is required to guarantee seating. All sales are final; refunds and exchanges are not permitted. Programs and dates are subject to change. Management reserves the right to refuse admission to latecomers. Program tickets do not include Museum admission unless otherwise noted.
For any questions, please email public.programs@nyhistory.org.