State of the Union: On foreign policy, a link between Trump and Obama, CNN.com

State of the Union: On foreign policy, a link between Trump and Obama

Peter Bergen

If there was an underlying theme in President Trump’s State of the Union about America’s engagement in the world you could sum it up in one word: Withdrawal.
Trump pointed to the nearly 7,000 American servicemen killed in the United States’ long post-9/11 wars and the more than 50,000 who have been badly wounded. He also asserted an exaggerated figure that the US has “spent more than 7 trillion dollars in the Middle East.”
The President said that some 2,000 US soldiers in Syria are being withdrawn now that ISIS has been largely been evicted from the territory it held there.
Trump also confirmed that his administration “is holding constructive talks with…the Taliban.” Progress in those negotiations, Trump said, would enable a drawdown of the estimated 14,000 US troops in Afghanistan, leaving some kind of residual force to focus on “counterterrorism.”
All of this is consistent with what Trump said during the presidential campaign when he repeatedly complained about the trillion of dollars that the US. had spent on its post-9/11 wars in the greater Middle East.
Even before he started campaigning, Trump had tweeted in 2013, “Let’s get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense! Rebuild the USA.”
Once you get past their rhetorically quite different styles this is an important commonality between President Barack Obama and Trump: Both saw them themselves as elected to get the United States out of the seemingly endless, expensive post-9/11 wars.
Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America and professor of practice at Arizona State University. He has reported from Afghanistan for two and a half decades and is the co-editor of “Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion.”

Talking to a Former Terrorist: American Al-Qaeda Bryant Neal Viñas, Spy Museum, DC

Talking to a Former Terrorist: American Al-Qaeda Bryant Neal Viñas

March 18, 2019 @ 12:00PM — 2:00PM

Bryant Neal Viñas, ‘American Al-Qaeda’ tells his story at the International Spy MuseumShare:

In 2009, Bryant Neal Viñas, an American born in New York to a family of Catholic Hispanic immigrants, pleaded guilty on charges of conspiracy to murder U.S. citizens, and for providing material support to Al-Qaeda. The media referred to him as ‘American Al-Qaeda’ and reported his intriguing journey from the New York suburbs to Pakistan to attack U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. Viñas proceeded to cooperate with law enforcement and intelligence officials, in what has been described as a “treasure trove” of valuable information about the inner-workings of the Al-Qaeda network. What was the nature of Viñas’s radicalization? How does a Western-born jihadist get through terrorist training in Pakistan?


PARTICIPANTS:

Bryant Neal Viñas

Former American Al-Qaeda member

Mitchell Silber
Former Director of Intelligence Analysis, NYPD

Christopher Costa, COL, USA (Ret.)

Executive Director, International Spy Museum

Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counter-terrorism – NSC

MODERATOR:

Peter Bergen

Vice President, Global Studies & Fellows, New America


Event Location

 

International Spy Museum
700 L’Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20024
Can’t Attend?

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Is the Trump team pulling off a diplomatic coup to end America’s longest war? CNN.com

Is the Trump team pulling off a diplomatic coup to end America’s longest war?

Taliban offer opportunities for peace talks

Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America and professor of practice at Arizona State University. He has reported from Afghanistan for two and a half decades and is the co-editor of “Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion.” The opinions expressed in this commentary are his own; view more opinion at CNN.

(CNN)Negotiations between the Taliban and US officials appear to have produced a breakthrough: A framework for an agreement that the Taliban will not host any foreign terrorist groups in exchange for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. In this framework agreement, the Taliban would also agree to a ceasefire and start talks directly with the Afghan government, according to the New York Times.

There could be much to celebrate in such an agreement, which may, perhaps, end America’s longest war.

Peter Bergen

The Afghanistan negotiations have had none of the hoopla surrounding them that President Trump has injected into his discussions with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un about his nuclear program. So far, the North Korean negotiations have yielded nothing of substance, while the quiet discussions with the Taliban look like they might bring to a close the war that began after al Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan, attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.
Zalmay Khalilzad, who served as US ambassador to Afghanistan for President George W. Bush and is now President Trump’s special representative for Afghanistan, spearheaded the negotiations with the Taliban.
Khalilzad posted on Twitter on Saturday that he had just wound up six days of talks with the Taliban in Doha, the capital of Qatar, and that the “meetings here were more productive than they have been in the past. We made significant progress on vital issues.”
Khalilzad also tweeted that he had briefed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul on Sunday “on the progress we have made.”
A signal of the seriousness with which the Taliban are approaching the talks with the Americans is that their negotiating team is headed by Mullah Baradar, a founder of the Taliban who was released from prison in Pakistan in September, seemingly for the purpose of moving peace talks forward.
This was a key development as the Taliban is splintered into a number of different groupings and factions, and only someone as senior in the Taliban as Mullah Baradar can speak for the whole movement.

Why now?

After 18 years of war, why have the United States and the Taliban finally come to the negotiating table in a meaningful way? The American academic I. William Zartman pointed out that warring parties usually only start seriously negotiating when they have come to recognition of a “mutually hurting stalemate.”
A year ago the previous US commander in Afghanistan, General John “Mick” Nicholson, testified before the Senate Armed Service Committee that the Afghan War was indeed in a “stalemate.”
For their part, the Taliban have fought for almost two decades and have yet to hold an Afghan town or city for anything more than a few days.
Add to this mix President Donald Trump, who has long been a skeptic about doing more in Afghanistan, and who tweeted in 2013, “Let’s get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense! Rebuild the USA.”
The recognition of a mutually hurting stalemate between the Taliban and the United States, as well as Trump’s skepticism about the American role in Afghanistan, have all combined to produce this moment in which some kind of peace deal may be possible.

Key questions

However, the devil will be in the details if a real peace is to be achieved with the Taliban.
First, will the Taliban agree to abide by the Afghan constitution that was ratified in 2004 and guarantees the rights of women to work and girls to be educated? When the Taliban was in power before being ousted shortly after the 9/11 attacks, they denied women and girls these fundamental rights.
Second, will the Taliban agree to a ceasefire with the Afghan forces that are doing most of the fighting against the Taliban? The Taliban position has long been they only want to negotiate with the Americans, but clearly the next step toward peace is to enter into discussions with the Afghan government.
Third, will the Taliban engage in normal politics in which they might be granted certain government ministries or provincial governorships? And will they promise not to interfere in the key Afghan presidential elections that are scheduled for July?
Fourth, will Western hostages that are held by the Taliban be released? These include US citizen Kevin King, 62, who is believed to be seriously ill, according to NBC News, and Australian citizen Timothy Weeks, 50, who were kidnapped in 2016 in Kabul near the American University in Afghanistan, where they were both teachers.
Fifth, will an American peace deal with the Taliban really end the war? Simply because American forces withdraw doesn’t mean the war might not continue between the Taliban and the Afghan government. You only have to look at the rise of ISIS in Iraq during 2014, following a complete American withdrawal from the country three years earlier, to see how bad things could also get in Afghanistan absent American forces.
Sixth, what are the enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the Taliban abides by any agreement on barring foreign jihadist groups, or any other agreements they might enter into.

Trump’s Syria morass, CNN.com

Trump’s Syria morass

Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. He is the author of “United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorists.” The opinions expressed in this commentary are his own. View more opinion articles at CNN.

(CNN)The suicide attack that killed four Americans, including two US soldiers, on Wednesday in Manbij, Syria, is a vivid reminder of the confused and confusing state of US policy in Syria, a confusion that has been engendered almost entirely by President Donald Trump.

We don’t know the circumstances of the attack in detail, but it comes at an especially chaotic time.
In a phone conversation on December 14 with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump promised Erdogan that all American troops would leave Syria soon since ISIS, in Trump’s view, was already defeated. Trump told Erdogan, “It’s all yours. We are done.”
Five days later Trump posted a video to Twitter in which he said that the approximately 2,000 US troops that are in Syria “are all coming back now.”
What was especially odd about this assertion was that Trump had repeatedly warned during his campaign that he wouldn’t give America’s enemies any heads up about his military plans, as the Obama administration had done when it had announced withdrawal dates for US forces from Afghanistan.
Trump’s abrupt shift in Syria policy precipitated the resignation of both the US Defense Secretary James Mattis and Brett McGurk — who coordinated the many dozens of countries in the global coalition against ISIS at the US State Department.
The Pentagon then let it be known the withdrawal of US troops would in fact not happen immediately, but it would take place over about four months.
Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton was dispatched to the Middle East to provide some kind of ex post facto cleanup for Trump’s hasty decision on Syria, which hadn’t been coordinated with the Pentagon or other parts of the US government or American allies such as Israel.
On January 6 in Israel Bolton muddied the waters further, saying that the US would only withdraw from Syria if ISIS was destroyed and the safety of America’s Kurdish allies fighting ISIS was guaranteed. Turkey regards armed Kurdish groups in Syria as “terrorists” and without an American security umbrella would likely attack them.
This produced a furious response from Erdogan who thought he had made a deal with Trump. Erdogan said on live TV, “Bolton’s remarks in Israel are not acceptable. It is not possible for me to swallow this. Bolton made a serious mistake.”
Today US policy in Syria is as clear as mud: Already the Pentagon is withdrawing some military equipment from Syria.
At the same time, Trump has been warned by his own commanders that ISIS has not been entirely defeated in Syria.
Will US forces stay in Syria to finish off ISIS? Clearly the terror group has some life left given the attack in Manbij on Wednesday, for which it claimed responsibility.
Will the US secure some kind of guarantee from the Turks that they won’t attack its Kurdish allies in Syria?
None of this is clear and for that we mostly have the impulsive President of the United States to blame, a leader who makes hasty policy decisions based on his gut and without consulting even his own National Security Council.

An expensive lesson in hubris for the United States, CNN.com

An expensive lesson in hubris for the United States

Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America, a professor of practice at Arizona State University and the author of “Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad.” The opinions expressed in this commentary are his own; view more opinion at CNN.

(CNN)On Thursday the US Army War College published a monumental and authoritative history of the Iraq War. One of its sober conclusions: “An emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor” of the Iraq War.

Under the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Iran and Iraq had waged an almost decade-long war of attrition during the 1980s. With Saddam deposed as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has since expanded its influence not only into Iraq but also into Syria and Yemen.
Too often, US military histories focus only on tactical issues that are unmoored from deeper political questions, which of course misses the point; as Clausewitz famously observed, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”
The Army’s history of the Iraq War, while focusing on the Army’s operations, also takes into account the many political factors in Washington and on the ground in Iraq that affected the course of the war, and it also takes to task American political and military leaders for errors that they made during the conflict.
The essential message of the Iraq War history is that wishful thinking and ignorance were the key drivers of the early decision-making about the conflict.
The history was commissioned by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno in 2013. Odierno told Army historians that it was necessary to write a real history of the Iraq War because the Army had never done one for the Vietnam War, and had spent the first few years of the Iraq conflict relearning costly lessons from that conflict.
To inform the Iraq War history, the Army declassified 30,000 pages of documents related to the conflict.
Army historians also performed more than 100 interviews with key players such as President George W. Bush. (Disclosure: I was one of the peer reviewers for the manuscript and also know the two historians who led the project, now-retired Army Cols. Joel Rayburn and Frank Sobchak.)
The Army’s history is likely to be the most authoritative account of the Iraq War by any American institution. Unlike in the United Kingdom, where there was the seven-year Chilcot Inquiry into the British role in the Iraq War, hitherto there has been no official American investigation into the conduct of the most lethal and costly conflict that the United States has fought since Vietnam.

Devastating portrait of Rumsfeld

The Iraq War history is a reminder that President Bush committed the United States to a costly and counterproductive war, the planning for which began only two months after the 9/11 attacks. According to the history, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked war planners at the Pentagon for plans for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime on November 27, 2001. This was before the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan had even been completed and al Qaeda was still fighting American soldiers on the ground there.
The history paints a devastating portrait of Rumsfeld, the only Bush administration official who refused to do an interview with the Army historians. Rumsfeld kept pushing for a smaller number of troops for the initial invasion of Iraq and also the subsequent occupation of the country. As a result, the war was always under-resourced in terms of the number of troops on the ground necessary “to defeat both the Sunni insurgency (including al Qaeda in Iraq) and the Iranian-backed Shia militants simultaneously,” according to the history.
Another problem was that the United States knew very little about Iraq. The history points out that there were “gaping holes in what the US military knew about Iraq. This ignorance included Iraqi politics, society, and government — gaps that led the United States to make some deeply flawed assumptions about how the war was likely to unfold.”
One of those flawed assumptions was that the Pentagon believed the Iraqis would greet the US military as liberators just as they had been in France when they liberated the country from the Nazis at the end of World War II. It didn’t, of course, turn out that way.

Some of the greatest blunders

The Iraq War study also helps shed considerable light on two of the greatest blunders of the conflict, which were the first two orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that oversaw the US occupation of Iraq. The first order was to fire between 30,000 and 50,000 leading members of the Baathist party and the second was to dissolve the Iraqi army.
Those orders helped set the stage for the subsequent insurgency, since hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers were suddenly out on the street without a job and the large-scale firing of the Baathists left the country without many capable administrators who had joined the party simply because it was a requirement for their jobs.
On May 9, 2003, Rumsfeld ordered Paul “Jerry” Bremer, who led the CPA, to “actively oppose” organizations loyal to Saddam Hussein, and the Pentagon drafted an order to remove anyone from office who was in the top four levels of the Baath party. Ten days later, Bremer sent a memo to Rumsfeld recommending the dissolution of the Iraqi army.
Toward the end of May, Bremer announced the de-Baathification order and dissolved all the units of the Iraqi military. President Bush told the Army historians that the order dissolving the Iraqi military surprised him, but the Iraqi army had effectively disbanded already, and Bremer was closer to the situation on the ground than he was.
Then-Brig. Gen. Mark Hertling, now a CNN contributor, received the news about the dissolution of the Iraqi army when he was in the middle of addressing 600 senior Iraqi military officers that he was trying to recruit to participate in the reconstitution of the Iraqi army, according to the history.
These early CPA decisions “effectively collapsed the edifice of the Iraqi state, creating a national governance and security vacuum that would take another six to seven years to refill. When combined with abortive reconstruction efforts and unmet popular expectations, these factors became major contributors to Iraq’s gradual descent into full insurgency and civil war,” according to the history.
The Army history is far from entirely critical, pointing to areas of innovation, such as the early adoption of counterinsurgency tactics by some Army units and the reconciliation efforts with Sunni tribes that once had fought the American military but were eventfully put on the US payroll.
Other innovations included the use of commanders’ funds to sustain local projects and the creation of highly effective medical evacuation systems that resulted in a much higher survival rate for the wounded than was the case in previous conflicts.

A new approach in early 2007

When it became clear that the United States was losing the Iraq War in early 2007, a new approach and a new commander were installed by the Bush administration. The new approach was deploying counterinsurgency tactics with a larger American force on the ground that was led by Gen. David Petraeus. Petraeus positioned many of his forces to live among the population rather than on massive bases insulated from the Iraqi people as had previously been the case. This generated more intelligence about the insurgents and also helped to tamp down the sectarian conflicts in Iraq.
This approach finally turned the conflict around so that the violence began to abate dramatically in Iraq. Insurgent attacks went down from a high of 140 a day, so that by the end of 2008 “the coalition routinely experienced days with no attacks at all throughout the entire country,” according to the history.
The Iraq War history ends with the pullout of all US troops in 2011, so it doesn’t recount the rise of ISIS in Iraq three years later, which itself was a product of the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003. As a result of that invasion, al Qaeda, which had had no presence in Iraq under Saddam, formed Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is the parent organization of ISIS.
This is all an expensive lesson in hubris for the United States. As the Army history recounts, “Nearly 4,500 American military personnel lost their lives in the fighting, and another 32,000 were wounded — many of them grievously. More than 300 soldiers from other coalition nations also perished. Estimates on Iraqi casualties vary wildly, ranging from roughly 200,000 killed to more than a million.
“Monetary costs, for the United States only, are similarly hard to approximate due to the challenge in estimating future costs for veterans’ care and the interest on loans taken out to finance the war. There is no question that the war has been expensive, ranging even among the lower estimates from a cost of over 800 billion to nearly 2 trillion dollars.”
Hopefully the Army history will teach future generations of military and political leaders what pitfalls can be avoided the next time the United States decides to fight a complex insurgency war.

THE ROAD TO 9/11, HISTORY

Peter Bergen was a consultant.

SIX, HISTORY

Peter Bergen was a consulting producer.

Border wall would do nothing to stop terrorism. And there is no national emergency. CNN.com

(CNN)The Trump administration is framing the necessity of a southern border wall, in part, as a response to a national security emergency involving terrorists. This is a barrel of bunkum and balderdash served with generous helpings of hogwash.

Where to begin? Let’s start with the fact that there is no terrorism emergency. 2018 saw one of the lowest yearly numbers of jihadist terrorism cases in the United States — 14 — since the 9/11 attacks, according to New America, a research institution that tracks terrorism.
The largest number of such cases was in 2015 when there were 80.
While the number of terrorism cases is not an exact proxy for levels of threat, it certainly says something about the scale of the threat and the United States has seen a steep decline in the number of jihadist terrorism cases over the past four years.
This decline tracks with the declining fortunes of ISIS. When it controlled territory the size of the United Kingdom, thousands of Islamist militants joined or attempted to join ISIS, including from the United States. Now the geographical caliphate is almost entirely gone and ISIS recruitment has slowed to a trickle.
In the United States since the 9/11 attacks, 455 jihadist terrorists have been charged or convicted or died before they faced trial. Not one of these terrorists crossed the southern border.
It turns out that terrorists trying to attack the United States would prefer not to travel to Central America or Mexico and then try their chances crossing the southern border. They want to fly directly to the States.
And anyway, the vast majority of terrorists don’t enter the United States at the southern border or anywhere else, because they are already in the country. Of the 455 jihadist terrorism cases since 9/11, 84% involved US citizens or permanent residents, and every lethal terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 was carried out by a US citizen or legal resident.
On Sunday, Sarah Sanders, the White House press secretary was interviewed by Chris Wallace on Fox News, who challenged her on the supposed terrorist threat at the border.
Sanders asserted, “We know that 4,000 known or suspected terrorists come into our country illegally and we know that the most vulnerable point of entry is at our southern border.”
This is itself is a misleading statistic since these 4,000 individuals are not really terrorists but have shown up as a “hit” on a terrorist watch list. The ‘TIDE’ terrorism watch list as of 2017 consisted of 1.6 million individuals who are deemed to have some possible link to terrorism.
The 4,000 individuals turned away from entering the US are those who may have some kind of putative connection to terrorism. They are not proven terrorists,
otherwise, they would be arrested and charged. And there isn’t a case since 9/11 of a terrorist being arrested at the border, according to New America’s research.
A southern border wall would do absolutely nothing to stop terrorism, which in the United States today is almost entirely a “homegrown” phenomenon driven by jihadist materials on the internet, which knows no borders.

 

Now Trump is at war with the generals, CNN.com

Now Trump is at war with the generals

Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America, and a professor of practice at Arizona State University. He is writing a book for Penguin/Random House about the Trump administration’s national security team and its policies. The opinions expressed in this commentary are his own. View more opinion at CNN.

(CNN)President Donald Trump is at war with the generals.

The latest salvo in that war came on New Year’s morning — not traditionally a time for recrimination — in a presidential tweet that denigrated retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Trump tweeted, “‘General’ McChrystal got fired like a dog by Obama. Last assignment a total bust. Known for big, dumb mouth. Hillary lover!”
This tweet followed an interview that McChrystal gave to ABC’s Martha Raddatz on Sunday in which he described Trump as both immoral and dishonest.
McChrystal had led Joint Special Operations Command during the Iraq War and had turned it into one of the most efficient killing machines in history. McChrystal later resigned as the commander of the Afghan War in 2010 following disparaging remarks that some officers on his staff had made to a Rolling Stone reporter about top officials working for President Barack Obama.
Trump is known for being a counterpuncher, so on one level it’s not surprising he reacted this way to McChrystal’s withering criticism.
But when you step back, the degree to which Trump is battling America’s generals is startling, considering how he began his presidency. Trump came into office besotted by military brass, appointing retired four star Gen. James Mattis as his secretary of defense, retired four star Gen. John Kelly as his secretary of homeland security and later chief of staff, and retired three star Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn as his national security adviser. After Flynn was forced out of the White House, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster assumed the role of national security adviser.
Now, two years later, Trump is eager to tear down the generals. After Mattis announced his resignation with a letter distancing himself from Trump’s key foreign policy positions on December 20 and said that he would stay in the job until the end of February to allow for an orderly transition, Trump instead pushed him out at the end of December.
The differences between Trump and US military leaders are more than simply stylistic, although Trump’s lack of decorum and rudeness are certainly at odds with the military’s honor-based values.
The military tends to want to sustain overseas military commitments, which they see as vital to securing world order, whether that is to defeat ISIS, or to contain a nuclear-armed North Korea, or to prevent Afghanistan from reverting into control by the Taliban.
Trump believes he was elected to end foreign entanglements and that alliances like NATO are “ripping off” the United States, while US military leaders are keenly aware that NATO allies have been fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with them since the 9/11 attacks.
The policy differences between Trump and the military were underlined by Mattis’s resignation, which came as a result of Trump announcing a total withdrawal of the 2,000 US troops in Syria. Mattis appears to have resigned because this decision was made in an arbitrary way and without consulting allies. The Kurds who have been fighting ISIS in Syria on behalf of the United States risk being left defenseless on the battlefield by this move, which potentially subjects them to attack by superior Turkish forces that regard them as terrorists.
When Mattis announced his resignation, Trump tweeted, “When President Obama ingloriously fired Jim Mattis, I gave him a second chance. Some thought I shouldn’t, I thought I should.”
It is true that Mattis’ term as head of Central Command was wound up early by the Obama administration, but far from merely giving Mattis a “second chance,” Trump was quite eager to install Mattis as secretary of defense. He told reporters in mid-November 2016 after he had interviewed Mattis for the job, “He’s just a brilliant, wonderful man. What a career! We’re going to see what happens, but he is the real deal.”
A similar trajectory to how Trump treated Mattis also happened with John Kelly. In late July 2017, Trump tweeted “I am pleased to inform you that I have just named General/Secretary John F Kelly as White House Chief of Staff. He is a Great American….” Over time the bromance fizzled — as it so often does with Trump — and Kelly, no longer on speaking terms with the President, left as chief of staff at the end of December.
McMaster was also eased out by Trump following comments he made at the Munich Security Conference in late February, in which he described the recent American indictments of Russian officials for interference in the 2016 US presidential election as “incontrovertible” evidence that they had interfered in the election, something the President has always been reluctant to admit.
Trump then tweeted, “General McMaster forgot to say that the results of the 2016 election were not impacted or changed by the Russians and that the only Collusion was between Russia and Crooked H, the DNC and the Dems. Remember the Dirty Dossier, Uranium, Speeches, Emails and the Podesta Company!”
McMaster retired six weeks later.
In November, Chris Wallace of Fox News asked Trump about retired Adm. Bill McRaven’s comments that Trump’s attacks on the news media were “the greatest threat to democracy in my lifetime.”
Stay up to date…
Trump told Wallace that McRaven was a “Hillary fan,” and when Wallace pointed out that McRaven was the architect of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, Trump asked, “Wouldn’t it have been nice if we got Osama bin Laden a lot sooner than that, wouldn’t it have been nice?” This was a bizarre comment to make about what is arguably one of the greatest intelligence and special operations victories in American history.
Trump has now made a sharp break with Kelly, Mattis, McChrystal, McRaven, and McMaster, some of the leading American generals and admirals of our era.
Why Trump, even given his policy disagreements, would pick a war with the military leaders he once so publicly admired is a puzzle that future historians will surely try to unpack.

Trump’s bizarre decision on Syria, CNN.com

Trump’s bizarre decision on Syria
Peter Bergen

By Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst

Updated 6:48 PM ET, Wed December 19, 2018

Trump orders US withdrawal from Syria 02:34

“Peter Bergen is CNN’s national security analyst, a vice president at New America, a professor of practice at Arizona State University and the author of “Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad.”

(CNN)The ever-unpredictable President Donald Trump has ordered the withdrawal of the 2,000 US ground troops in Syria who are training local forces to fight ISIS, according to a US defense official who spoke to CNN.

This comes after the Trump administration had finally brought some coherence to its Syria strategy under veteran diplomat Ambassador James Jeffrey and retired Army Col. Joel Rayburn, both of whom have deep experience in the region.

Until Wednesday, US policy in Syria was easy to describe: Defeat ISIS, maintain US forces in Syria until Iranian military forces withdraw from the country, and push for a transition away from the government of Bashar al Assad.

But news of the withdrawal broke on Wednesday after Trump tweeted, “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency.”

Just four days ago, Brett McGurk, the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to defeat ISIS, warned against a withdrawal when I interviewed him at the Doha Forum in Qatar on Saturday.

While McGurk called ISIS a “significantly degraded organization,” he added, “But no one who does this day to day is naive enough to know you can just declare victory and walk away. We have to maintain pressure on these networks really, for a period of years.”

Pulling US troops out now would be premature and doing so would hand over an unexpected Christmas gift to five American adversaries: Assad, Assad’s close allies including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, as well as ISIS and al Qaeda, whose virulent Syrian affiliate goes by a variety of names, including Al Nusra.

Head scratching hardly begins to cover it.

While Trump has expressed his desire to pull out of Syria before, there were two main arguments that might have held him back.

The first: Why replicate the total withdrawal of US troops in Iraq — first set in motion by President George W. Bush before the Obama administration made the official announcement at the end of 2011 — which helped set the stage for the return of ISIS?

The second: Why hand over Syria to the Russians and the Iranians?

It seems these arguments are no longer persuasive to Trump.

Unfortunately, according to UN Undersecretary-General for Counter-Terrorism Vladimir Voronkov, who spoke on the panel I moderated at the Doha Forum, there are an estimated 20,000 ISIS fighters left in the world, many of whom are in Iraq and Syria.

Then add to that the fact al Qaeda’s affiliate and offshoots in Syria are estimated as of August to have 10,000 fighters, according to UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura.

If there is one key lesson we have learned from fighting jihadist terrorist groups in the 17 years since 9/11 it is that they thrive in weak or failing Muslim states such as Syria, and other countries where the United States has little to no presence.\

The Syrian pullout would run the risk of negating so many of the gains that have been made against ISIS. It also leaves the United States’ Syrian Kurdish partners, who have done the bulk of the fighting against ISIS, to fend for themselves against the powerful Turkish military, which regards them as terrorists.

And we’ve run a version of this play before. After the United States pulled out of Iraq, the group that later became ISIS first organized in Syria in 2011 before it invaded Iraq three years later and took over territory the size of Great Britain, controlling a population of nearly 12 million.

It’s mystifying why Trump is risking even a limited repetition of this mistake.